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Notes and Comments
B. Richard Bell*

Territorial Jurisdiction of
Municipal and Regional
Police Personnel in New
Brunswick

In a free and democratic society, it is essential that citizens know
beyond any doubt the territorial jurisdiction of police officers who
may attempt to deprive them of their liberty. It is equally as
important for police officers to know with certainty their territorial
jurisdiction.
Recent cases from the Court of Queen's Bench of New
Brunswick and the Court of Appeal reflect the uncertainty in this
area of the law. Any analysis of this issue must commence with the
case of Regina v. Soucy (1975) 11 N.B.R. (2d) 75 (C.A.).
In Soucy, the accused had been stopped by a Rothesay police
officer outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Town of Rothesay.
The police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe
Soucy had committed the offence of driving while impaired by
alcohol and gave him a breathalyzer demand. Soucy refused and
was charged with the offence of refusal contrary to subsection
235(2) of the CriminalCode R.S.C. 1970 c. C-34 as amended.
At trial the accused was convicted. By way of trial de novo an
acquittal was entered. The Crown then launched an appeal. The
Appellant argued that the Rothesay police officer was a "peace
officer" as found in section 2 of the Criminal Code and was
therefore authorized to administer a demand pursuant to section 235
whether functioning within or outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Limerick, J.A. for the full Court disagreed and stated at page 81:
"To authorize a peace officer as appointed by the Town of
Rothesay for the preservation of peace to make a demand for a
breathalyzer test outside the boundaries of the Town, would
require further statutory authority which does not exist in this
Province".
The Crown appeal was dismissed and Soucy's acquittal upheld.
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Post Soucy Developments
Subsequent to the Soucy decision the Legislature of New Brunswick
appeared to provide the statutory authority alluded to by Limerick,
J.A. in the form of subsections 2(2) and 12(l) of the Police Act,
S.N.B. 1977 c.P-9.2 which provided as follows:
2(2) Every member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and
every member of a police force have all the powers, authority,
privileges, rights and immunities of a peace officer and constable
in and for the Province of New Brunswick, and are ex officio
inspectors under the Motor Carrier Act, game wardens under the
Game Act, industrial fire wardens under the Forest Fires Act, and
fishery guardians under the Fisheries Act, and each member of
and above the rank of corporal may exercise the powers conferred
by section 9 of the Fire Prevention Act.
12(1) Each police officer appointed under this Act is charged
with responsibility for
a) maintaining law and order,
b) preventing offences against the law,
c) enforcing penal provisions of the law,
d) escorting and conveying persons in custody to or from a
court or other place,
e) serving and executing court process in respect of offences
against the law,
f) maintaining order in the courts, and
g) performing all other duties and services which may
lawfully be executed and performed by him,
and shall discharge his responsibility
h) within the limits of the municipality for which he is
appointed, and
i) within the province
i) at the request of the minister, or
ii) when he is investigating a matter that arose wholly or
partially within, or is pursuing a person fleeing, from the
municipality for which he is appointed, but in such case
shall immediately notify the police force responsible for
policing the area in which he is acting of the purpose of his
investigation or action.
Subsection 2(2) appeared to clothe police officers appointed in
and for a municipality with provincial jurisdiction. However, any
legislative attempt to do so was nullified by the specific wording of
paragraphs 12(1) (h) and (i). These latter provisions restricted the
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territorial jurisdiction of police officers to their municipality and
only permitted an "extended status" where they were:
1) requested by the Minister of Justice to act outside their
territorial jurisdiction;
2) investigating a matter that arose wholly or partially within
their jurisdiction; or
3) in hot pursuit of persons fleeing from their territorial
jurisdiction.
The first reported case dealing with the jurisdictional provisions
of the Police Act was Regina v. Arsenault (1980) 31 N.B.R. (2d)
365 (C.A.) which parallelled the Soucy case. In Arsenault a
Rothesay Police Officer, in response to a telephone call, drove to
Gondola Point, New Brunswick, a community outside his territorial
jurisdiction, where the accused was found in an intoxicated position
behind the steering wheel of a parked car. The breathalyzer demand
administered by the police officer was refused by the accused.
At trial, Arsenault was acquitted on the basis that the police
officer had no jurisdiction outside the municipality for which he was
appointed. The Crown appealed contending that subsection 2(2) of
the Police Act permitted municipal police officers to function as
peace officers anywhere within the Province. The Court of Appeal
disagreed, followed Soucy and upheld the acquittal.
As a result of Arsenault, it became clear that police officers
appointed for a municipality have no status outside their municipal
boundaries unless such status is clearly derived from the "extended
jurisdiction" provisions of the Police Act.
Those provisions were amended by the Statutes of New
Brunswick 1981 c.59, s.91. Sub-paragraphs 12(1) (h) (i) (ii) (iii)
now provide that a police officer appointed for a municipality or
region shall discharge his responsibilities:
"(i) within the limits of the municipality or region for which he
was appointed,
(ii) at the request of or with the written authorization of the
Minister, throughout the Province or such area of the Province as
the Minister designates, and
(iii) when he is investigating a matter that arose wholly or
partially within, or is pursuing a person fleeing from, the
1. The amending legislation also provided for the establishment of regional police
forces within New Brunswick. Therefore, any references to municipal police
officers and their jurisdiction is equally applicable to regional police personnel.
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municipality or region for which he was appointed, throughout
the Province."
Upon reading the above paragraphs several questions arise:
1. Under what circumstances is one investigating a matter that
arose wholly or partially within his jurisdiction?,
2. When does a matter cease to be under investigation?, and
3. Is it constitutionally valid to clothe a member of the Executive
branch of government within the power to extend the territorial
jurisdiction of police officers?
Is A Matter UnderInvestigation?
In Regina v. Crain (1981) 35 N.B.R. (2d) 464 (Q.B.D.) Mr. Justice
Stevenson addressed the issue of whether a matter was being
investigated that had arisen wholly or partially within the territorial
jurisdiction of the police officer or whether a case of hot pursuit had
been established.
In Crain the accused was a passenger in a vehicle which sped
away from the police and left the municipality for which the
pursuing police officer had been appointed. The police officer
eventually stopped the vehicle outside the municipal limits. Crain
and the driver attempted to run away. Crain was apprehended and
taken into custody pursuant to the provisions of the Intoxicated
Persons Detention Act. 2 He resisted the efforts of the police and was
charged with the offence of resisting a police officer in the lawful
execution of his duty.
At trial, Mr. Justice Stevenson concluded the municipal police
officer had no jurisdiction to take Crain into custody because he was
not investigating the intoxication of Crain when the chase
commenced, nor was he pursuing Crain. At page 468 His Lordship
states:
"Constable Osmond was not investigating any intoxication of
the respondent in a public place within the town. And his pursuit
was really pursuit of the driver of the car in which the respondent
was a passenger and who may have remained in the car
involuntarily when the chase began".
In Crain, Stevenson, J. was dealing with the Police Act prior to
the recent amendments. However, his comments with respect to
jurisdiction are equally applicable to the present legislation.

2. R.S.N.B., 1973, c. 1-14.
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The result of Crain is clear. While provisions of the Police Act
might broaden a police officer's "territorial jurisdiction", his
power to function as a peace officer outside the municipality is
restricted to the subject matter that originally caused him to leave
the municipal limits. The extended jurisdiction is defined by subject
matter rather than geographical limits. That is, one may find himself
geographically situated such that he has peace officer status
vis-a-vis offence "X" but not offence "Y" which is unfolding
before him.
When Does An Investigation Cease?
The recent case of Meryl Geoffrey Stewart v. Her Majesty The
Queen (1982) 39 N.B.R. 444 (C.A.) addresses the issue of whether
a matter is or is not still under investigation.
As a result of an investigation by the police into an alleged
property damage within the City of Saint John a warrant in the first
instance was issued pursuant to Part XIV of the Criminal Code for
the arrest of Stewart.
The police had been unable to execute the warrant within the
territorial limits of the City. On September 3rd, 1981, Detective
Desmond of the Saint John Police Department was instructed by his
superior to seek the accompaniment of the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police and effect the arrest of the accused who was then staying at
Bloomfield Ridge, a point outside the city limits.
Mr. Justice LaForest, J.A., set forth the following facts which
had been agreed upon by both parties:
"Detective Desmond, accompanied by an R.C.M.P. officer,
found the Appellant at Bloomfield Ridge in the territorial area
covered by the R.C.M.P.
Detective Desmond put his hand on the Appellant, told him he
was under arrest, to which the Appellant replied: "You got me".
When Detective Desmond took his hand off the Appellant, the
Appellant ran away". 3
It should be noted that Detective Desmond did not have the warrant
with him.
At trial Stewart was convicted of escaping lawful custody. On
appeal the appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered. The issue
was whether or not the accused had been in "lawful" custody at the
3. (1982) 39 N.B.R. 444 C 445 (C.A.).
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time of his escape. If Detective Desmond was without jurisdiction
to effect the arrest there could have been no lawful custody.
Had Detective Desmond had the warrant with him it is submitted
he could have effected the arrest of the accused pursuant to
sub-section 456.3(2) of the Criminal Code which provides as
follows:
"A warrant in accordance with this Part may be executed by a
person who is one of the peace officers to whom it is directed,
whether or not the place in which the warrant is to be executed is
within the territory for which the person is a peace officer".
Because Desmond did not have the warrant in his possession the
Crown sought to rely upon the argument that he was investigating a
matter that arose wholly or partially within his jurisdiction and was
therefore clothed with the jurisdiction necessary to effect the arrest.
The issue before their Lordships then became whether or not the
investigation was completed prior to the arrest or whether the arrest
of the accused was a step in the course of the investigation.
LaForest, J.A., expressed no reservations in reaching the
conclusion that:
"Detective Desmond was not engaged in an investigation; he set
out to arrest a person for an offence in 4respect of which an
investigation had already been conducted."
There is no question that an investigation had already been
conducted. However, and with respect, it is suggested the question
should not have been whether the investigation had been conducted
but whether it had been concluded.
Because a charge had been laid and a warrant issued it is
submitted one could properly says the police investigation was
concluded. In fact, it is suggested that the laying of a charge and
implementation of the judicial process would be a proper
benchmark for determining that an investigation has been
concluded.
Of very serious concern is the obiter of Mr. Justice LaForest
wherein he states:
"In fact, though I do not have to decide this, it is by no means
certain that the powers given to a peace officer under Section
12(1)(h) (iii) of the Police Act to make an investigation outside
his territorial jurisdiction necessarily includes the power of arrest.

4. Ibid., C 447.
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For courts will not interpret a statute as giving the power to arrest
without warrant unless that power is given in unambiguous
language.'" 5

The power to arrest given a police officer in criminal matters
flows from the CriminalCode. We may only look to the Police Act
to determine the extent of a person's jurisdiction as a peace officer.
In the event one is satisfied that such jurisdiction exists, is it not
correct to assume it must include the power to arrest?
If the matter is still under investigation, it seems clear that police
officers have an extended jurisdictional status (although that status
may be restricted as evidenced in Crain)pursuant to the Police Act.
To suggest that a person is considered a police officer for
investigational purposes but such status does not continue for
purposes of arrest suggests only one thing - "the investigation is
concluded immediately prior to the arrest".
With respect, the words "investigating a matter" must be given a
more expansive interpretation. It will be up to future Courts to
consider whether an investigation for purposes of the Police Act
ends immediately prior to arrest, upon the laying of an information,
or whether each case will be determined on its own merits. It is this
writer's view there are numerous situations where an arrest without
warrant would be a necessary ingredient to the investigative
process.
Extended Jurisdictionby the Minister of Justice
Finally, in considering the whole issue of municipal police
jurisdiction within New Brunswick, one must consider the extended
jurisdiction granted to municipal police officers upon the request or
with the written authorization of the Minister of Justice.
Set out below you will find the text of an authorization granted to
members of the St. Stephen Police Force:
AUTHORIZATION BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OFNEW
BRUNSWICK"
PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OF THE NEW BR UNSWICK
POLICEACT"
Pursuant to Section 12, Subsection (1) (h) (ii) of the Police Act
CH. P-9.2 Acts of New Brunswick 1977, I HEREBY
AUTHORIZE Chief Norman Penney, Deputy Chief Thomas E.
Gladney, Cpl. Ivan Cormier, Cpl. Kenneth Holmes, Cpl. Gary
5. Ibid., C 448.
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Sturgeon, Cst. Grady M. Curtis, Cst. Donald W. Marshall, Cst.
William S. Watters, Cst. Lewis W. Boutilier, Cst. Harold R.
Douthwrightl, Cst. John F. MacCready, of the St. Stephen Police
Department, to discharge their police responsibilities within a
50-mile radius of the municipality of St. Stephen.
This authorization shall remain in effect until 30 June 1982 unless
sooner revoked.
Dated at the City of Fredericton this 29th day of December A.D.
1981.
RODMAN E. LOGAN, Q.C.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK
Such authorizations are typical of those given to many municipal
police officers within New Brunswick. They are not published in
the Royal Gazette or local newspapers, nor are they advertised via
other modes of communication.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as found in the
ConstitutionAct, 1982,6 recognizes the principle of the rule of law
and in section 7, assures that:
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice".
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the rule of
law, simply stated, it reflects the belief that no one is above the law
and everyone is subject to the law.
One must question whether it is consistent with this principle to
permit the Minister of Justice to extend, at his sole discretion and
without notice, the territorial jurisdiction of municipally appointed
police officers.
A municipal police officer attains his status as a police officer
upon appointment by the municipal council. A member of the New
Brunswick Highway Patrol attains his status as a provincial police
officer upon appointment by the Deputy Attorney General.
Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police attain federal
7
jurisdiction by virtue of the Royal CanadianMounted Police Act.
The legislature has properly extended the status of municipal police
officers within the text of the Police Act for specific purposes. In the
latter case the extended status is there for all citizens to read and is a
6. Canada Act, 1982, (U.K.), c. 11.
7. R.S.C., 1970, c.R-9, s.s.17(3).
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matter of public record. However, the procedure which is outlined
in paragraph 12 (1) (h) (ii) may be undertaken without regard to any
particular factor or without the provisions of any sort of public
notice! Such power within the executive Branch of government is
not, in my view, consistent with the rule of law.
One must also consider whether a citizen arrested by a municipal
police officer, acting on the basis of an authorization of the Minister
is being dealt with in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.
It is a long established right of citizens within our democracy to
physically resist any unlawful interference with their freedom. 8 The
citizen arrested by a municipally appointed police officer who is
acting on the basis of the Minister's authorization has no way of
knowing whether the interference is or is not lawful; and therefore
has no way of knowing whether he may lawfully resist the efforts of
the police. Would a denial of one's liberty in such circumstances be
contrary to the principle of fundamental justice?
Needless to say, if the right to fundamental justice commences
only upon implementation of the judicial process then this argument
is not valid. However, it does raise an interesting question
concerning the validity of the powers that have been given to the
Executive Branch of government.
Conclusion
In view of recent court decisions and the ambiguity contained within
the Police Act it is fair to say that municipal and regional police
personnel do not know the full extent or limits of their territorial
jurisdiction.
It is imperative that the Legislature of the Province of New
Brunswick either grant municipal police officers province-wide
status or ensure that all citizens are able to know with certainty the
territorial jurisdiction of municipal and regional police officers.
Regardless of the steps that are taken, police actions undertaken
on the basis of letters of authorization from the Minister deserve
serious examination and challenge by defense counsel.

8. See for example, Colet v. Regina (1981) 19 C.R. (3d) 84, (S.C.C.).

